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Ifrom Asia to Africa.
Bird flu 
AVIAN
• an animal health problem in countries of the South
• a H5N1 virus with pathogenic strains • birds that
die • other animal species concerned or infected •
healthy carriers • a proven risk for man • reasons for
fear, others for hope • a risk to be managed within
the context of the globalization of trade in animals
and animal products • problems and remedies to be
increasingly shared • scientific knowledge adapted
to diverse audiences.
Examination of a Hottentot teal hunted in Niger, 2006 - Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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Foreword
Above all else, bird flu, better named avian influenza, is an
animal health problem. The current episode originated in
Southeast Asia at least as far back as 1997. Its rapid spread
to Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa in 2005
and 2006 caused legitimate concern throughout the entire
world.
Once again, the most socially, economically, and educationally
disadvantaged populations are most exposed to this
epidemic, as much to its costs (mortality and the culling of
poultry) as to the health risks involved. To better share
knowledge with a broad spectrum of socio-economic classes
and age groups, researchers in the Animal Production and
Veterinary Medicine Department of CIRAD worked with
colleagues in the North and South to create this educational
handbook, imagined, constructed, and validated through their
scientific knowledge.
Emmanuel CAMUS
Director, EMVT Department, CIRAD
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Partner institutions
The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), created in 1924, is one
of the world's oldest intergovernmental organizations and also, with 167
member countries, one of the most representative.  Present on
5 continents through regional coordinators and a network of collaborating
centers and reference laboratories, the OIE manages a global surveillance
and early-warning system for animal health and plays a key role in the field
of scientific research and information.  OIE also defines health standards
for global trade in animals and animal products.  In this respect, it is a major
actor in political and financial mechanisms of international cooperation for
less advanced and developing countries.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
plays a leading role in international efforts against famine.  At the service of
developed and developing countries, it is a neutral tribunal within which all
countries may meet on an equal footing to negotiate agreements and
debate policy.  It also is a source of knowledge and information and works
to assist developing countries and countries in transition to modernize and
improve agricultural, forestry, and fishery practices and to guarantee good
nutrition for all.  Since its creation in 1945, it has consecrated particular
attention to the development of rural zones where 70% of the world's poor
and hungry live.  Its four main fields of activity consist of making
information available to all, sharing policy expertise, serving as a meeting
place for governments, and the transfer of knowledge to the field.
The Inter-African Bureau of Animal Resources of the African Union
(AU-IBAR) is a bureau of the Department of Rural Economics and
Agriculture of the African Union.  Its current mandate is to control major
trans-border diseases, improve genetic and food resources, develop
information, communication and technologies dedicated to animal
production, and reinforce the trade in animals and animal products through
an improvement of quality insurance and the harmonization of policies and
norms related to this trade.
The Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA)
ACP-EU was created in 1983 within the framework of the Lomé
Convention between governments in the ACP Group (African, Caribbean
and Pacific group of states) and member countries of the European Union.
Since 2000, the TCA operates within the context of the Cotonou ACP-CE
agreement.  The TCA's mission is to develop and provide services that
improve access of ACP countries to information on agricultural and rural
development and to reinforce the capacity of these countries to produce,
acquire, exchange, and exploit information in this field.
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in pursuing sectorial
policies and the Millennium objectives for development, aims to promote
the emergence of societies able to access production processes and the
diffusion of knowledge and culture.  In this regard, it provides its partners
support for sustainable development, particularly in the field of research
and the promotion of access to culture and knowledge.
IV
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VThe National Institute for Agriculture Research (INRA), founded in
1946,  is a mission-oriented public research institution working in the field
of agriculture, food, nutrition and food safety, environment and land
management, with particular emphasis on sustainable development. Its
human resources are 1840 researchers, 2360 engineers, 4640 technicians
and administrative staff, 1200 doctoral students and 1000 foreign trainees
and researchers. It is organized in 14 scientific departments and 21
regional centers. Its budget in 2005 was € 680 million.
Its principal goals are :
* to produce and disseminate scientific knowledge
* to develop innovations and know-how for the benefit of society
* to bring expertise for decision-making by public and private sector players
* to promote scientific culture and participate in the science / society debate
* to train in and through research.
INRA is involved in a large number of partnerships and exchanges with the
international scientific community in Europe, America, Asia and Africa.
Agropolis International was established in 1986 at the initiative of 17
research and higher education institutions with the support of the
Ministries of Research, Agriculture, and Cooperation. It now consists of 9
research organizations (BRGM, Cemagref, CEA, Cirad, CNRS, Ifremer,
Inra, Inserm, IRD), 14 research and training institutions (AGRO.M, CEP de
Florac, CIHEAM, IAM.M, CNEARC, ENGREF, ENSIA, SIARC, ESCAIA,
ICRA, ISTOM, UM I, UM II, UM III, UP Via Dominitia, SUP de CO), 1
coordinating group, 19 associated members and 3 local administrative
divisions.
The Aviculture Technical Institute (ITAVI) is a professional organization
specialized in the development of, and applied research in, poultry
farming, rabbit production, and goose and duck production.  It provides
technical and financial support to poultry farmers and to the overall sector.
Every year, ITAVI organizes a training program designed for actors in the
aviculture sector in tropical zones; it also has published two guides
focused on bird farming in hot climates to address the specific needs of
these professionals.
CEVA SANTE ANIMALE is a French veterinary pharmaceutical company with
an international reach.  Exclusively dedicated to animal health, the CEVA
SANTE ANIMALE group conceives, develops, registers, produces, and
markets veterinary medicines (antibiotics, control of reproduction,
vaccines, metabolic correctors, nervous system medicines, anti-
parasites).  Due to its presence in zones infected with avian influenza, the
CEVA SANTE ANIMALE group has been actively engaged in official avian
influenza vaccination programs since the beginning of the epizootic in
Asia.  Its long partnership with CIRAD testifies to its engagement.
The French Agricultural Research Centre for International
Development (CIRAD) focuses on research, experimentation, training
operations, information programs, and innovation.  Its strengths in life,
social, and engineering sciences are applied to food and agriculture and
to the management of natural resources and social issues.  One of the
missions of the Livestock Production and Veterinary Medicine department
is to capitalize on and expand current understanding of avian influenza.
Within the Innovation and Communication department, the Innovative
Education unit aims to bring educational value to scientific, technical, and
practical knowledge through novel means.
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A Wetlands International agent records data on avian influenza from wild birds sold
in the Mopti market in Mali, 2006 – Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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Preface
Recently, highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) has experienced a
spectacular expansion in numerous
countries.
Originating in Southeast Asia, it has
arrived in Africa after crossing several
European counties.
Its economic consequences, already serious in developed
countries, are dramatic for developing ones.
They are amplified by poor knowledge about the disease,
particularly a lack of reliable consumer information.
It therefore is important that this educational handbook, which
is destined for a wide audience, explains in clear terms, using
numerous illustrations, what HPAI really is.
I salute this initiative, and I hope that the greatest number of
people in our member countries may have access to it.
Bernard VALLAT
Director general
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
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Roadside sale of laying hens in Madagascar, 2006 – Renaud Lancelot, © Cirad
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Preface 
Despite international efforts, avian influenza
continues to spread throughout the world:
in 2006, several African countries were
affected one after another.
The propagation of the virus in Africa,
which lies at the heart of our Priority
Solidarity Zone (PSZ), requires new means
to assist our partner countries in
addressing the epizootic.  Beyond a moral duty to come to the
assistance of the most vulnerable, aiding these countries is in our own
interest because avian influenza illustrates the interdependence of the
world today: if the virus is not concretely controlled in developing
countries, it will continue to propagate beyond administrative borders.
The control of health crises are therefore everyone's business –
governments, international organizations, and citizens.  It is essential to
detect suspect cases as quickly as possible and to take the necessary
measures to treat them, but also to avoid risky behavior and
disproportionate responses that only amplify health and economic
damage.  For these reasons, it is important to develop effective and
appropriate forms of communication, using clear language, to respond
to people's legitimate concerns.
This need for information is particularly strong in the case of avian
influenza, an animal disease that has infected livestock on three
continents.  It must be emphasized that the people infected to date
were poultry farmers or members of their families who probably were
poorly informed about the disease, the behaviors to avoid, and the
precautions to take during their daily contact with poultry.
The educational handbook prepared by CIRAD is an attempt to
respond to this need for information.  It is addressed to all actors in the
field as well as to various opinion relay points in France's Priority
Solidarity Zone.  It is necessary to consolidate in a practical format the
main points of our current understanding of this virus whose animal
source must be controlled and the transmission between people
monitored.  I have no doubt that this document, a veritable vade-
mecum on avian influenza, will contribute to mobilization at the field
level, which France encouraged and for which it will continue to
resolutely act.
Brigitte GIRARDIN
Minister delegate for Cooperation,
Development and the French Speaking World
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Poultry production in
countries in the South 
Varied farm situations
In Southeast Asia, half of the poultry population is raised
intensively on medium to large scale commercial farms.  The
other half is a source of income for small farmers who keep
only a few dozen ducks, chickens, geese, or turkeys.  The
birds live together in close proximity to the farmer's family,
especially the children, who take care of and play with them.
At certain times of day and during certain periods of the year,
poultry and humans share the same habitat. 
In Africa, intensive poultry farming (or aviculture) has been
developed in North Africa (from Morocco to Egypt), South
Africa, and around the large cities of the Gulf of Guinea (Lagos,
Abidjan, …) and East Africa (Addis Ababa, Nairobi, …).
Elsewhere, backyard-bird farming dominates, with similar
promiscuity between people and poultry found in Southeast
Asia.
In Madagascar, the situation closely resembles Asia: large
areas are covered by rice fields with numerous geese and
duck farms in close contact with pigs and people.
Broiler farm on raised piles in Vietnam, 2002 – Vincent Porphyre, © Cirad
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Virus markets
Live-bird markets are a prime location for the transmission and
spread of viruses.  Contaminated animals that do not present
an obvious sign of disease may be bought and transported to
a new environment that is conducive to the spread of the virus.
In addition, small-scale farmers and merchants often come in
close contact with the poultry while transporting them by
hand, bicycle, cycle rickshaw, in public transportation, or in
the market stalls.
The return of unsold goods
Healthy birds may be contaminated in the market by other
diseased poultry and if they are not sold then spread the virus
upon their return to the family farm.
Poultry cages at the Mopti market in Mali, 2006 – Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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The chicken infected
with avian influenza
The classic signs
After an incubation period of 3 to 5 days, infected birds lack
an appetite, no longer lay eggs, and show symptoms in the
digestive, respiratory, and nervous systems.  The most
sensitive individuals die rapidly from hemorrhagic
septicemia.  In many cases, the mortality rate is brutal, killing
nearly the entire population of a hen house within a few
hours or days.
A new shared epidemic?
Veterinarians, like doctors, know that infected animals can
transmit pathogenic agents to the humans who care for them
or who eat them.  This is called a zoonosis.  In regards to bird
flu, cases of infection are noted when there is close contact
between humans and animals.  Although this is not a new
phenomenon, it is often misunderstood or ignored.
Heavy subcutaneous congestion in the abdominal region of a pullet infected with
avian influenza in Indonesia, 2004 - © CEVA SANTÉ ANIMALE Indonesia.
3 I THE INFECTED HOST
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An old acquaintance
Avian influenza is a poultry disease dreaded by farmers.  It
effectively can provoke a very high mortality among infected
broilers and laying hens, turkeys, quail, guinea fowl, ostrich,
geese, and ducks.  It first was described clinically in 1878.
In 1902, the causative agent was proven to be a virus.  This
agent was specifically identified in 1961.  Avian influenza
viruses that either are not or are only slightly pathogenic
circulate in all countries, most often without consequence or
with a weak impact on the health of poultry.
In contrast, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses
provoke a scourge known as fowl plague. When spread
over a large geographic area, they result in economically
devastating epidemics.
Another disease
The term, pseudo-plague, is reserved for Newcastle disease.
This is as dangerous for young chickens as avian flu.
Furthermore, it presents the same clinical signs, lesions, and
epidemiologic profile.  Geese and ducks are less affected.
Duck market
in Vietnam, 2003
Jean-Charles Maillard,
© Cirad
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The point of view
of poultry farmers
Commercial farmers
A HPAI epizootic is a catastrophe impossible to hide.  It causes
sudden and massive mortality among chickens that are raised
intensively.  In countries equipped with a well developed
veterinary infrastructure, commercial poultry farmers have no
choice but to actively cooperate with the veterinary services by
declaring a suspect case, accepting the diagnosis, and following
the control measures imposed by the official veterinary services:
the culling of chickens that are still alive, the disposal of the
carcasses according to strict bio-security standards, the
thorough disinfection of the site and material, the quarantine of
the farm, the provision of compensation, and the strict
surveillance of movement and of other birds in a several
kilometer radius from the outbreak.  The greatest amount of
transparency on the part of health authorities is obviously
indispensable for the proper management of this type of crisis.
Small farmers
An outbreak of HPAI on a small farm is a catastrophe because the
farmer knows that all of his animals will either die or be culled
while the compensation measures in many developing countries
are very uncertain.  Consequently, there is a strong temptation to
kill a sick animal at the first sign of disease to eat, sell, or – if it
already is dead - discretely get rid of the body.  Without specific
information and sensitization, a farmer will say nothing to
neighbors or the authorities.  This attitude is understandable
when the authorities in a country, although alerted to the risk, do
not diffuse information for fear of a negative impact on exports,
commerce, tourism, and more generally the overall reputation of
the country.
Backyard ducks in Niger, 2006 – Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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The transmission risk
HPAI virus transmission through the digestive system has not
been noted in humans.  The main mode of human
contamination is through ocular or respiratory routes.  It is
therefore necessary to wear protective masks and glasses (in
addition to gloves and overalls) when manipulating sick or
suspect birds.  The risk linked to the consumption of infected
poultry is indirect: via the fingers while touching the bird before
cooking, then through contact of the hand with the eyes or
nose.  Swallowing eggs is to be avoided because the virus
may be on the shells of eggs laid by a hen in the very first
stage of the disease (the hen later will cease to lay eggs).
Consequently, hand washing before and after touching food is
a simple and efficient preventive measure to be taken without
exception.
Frozen chicken, cooked chicken
The consumption of poultry or poultry products (eggs, meat,
foie gras…) presents no danger when veterinary control
measures are implemented correctly.  Products are only made
available for consumption several days after poultry are
slaughtered, which provides time for a potential infectious
outbreak to manifest itself on the source farm.
In case of doubt regarding the efficiency of the control
measures, well cooked meat (having a core temperature of
70°C for at least one second, in other words, meat without the
slightest trace of pink, including near the bones), presents no
risk.  A cooked egg also presents no risk.  However, freezing
does not destroy the virus; it conserves it.
Industrial battery of laying hens in Cambodia, 2002 – Vincent Porphyre, © Cirad
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The many forms
of HN viruses  
Definition of the viruses
The avian influenza virus is a small, infectious micro-organism
(approximately one hundred millionth of a millimeter).  It is
made up of a dozen proteins and of a genome sequence
segmented into 8 strands of ribonucleic acid (RNA).  Like all
viruses, the bird flu agent is by necessity an intracellular
parasite: it can only replicate itself within a cell in which it has
taken over the metabolism.  To enter a cell, the virus must bind
onto a specific receptor on the surface of the host cell.  This
capacity determines which cells are sensitive to infection and
which species are vulnerable to becoming infected.  Thus,
influenza viruses are highly host-specific, avian viruses having
much more affinity for avian cells than for human cells (and
vice versa).  The virus must adapt to a new species in order to
jump across the species barrier.
The influenza viruses  
Members of the Orthomyxoviridae family placed in the
Influenza genus, all avian influenza viruses have in common
internal type A antigens.  
The subtypes that affect birds are characterized by external
antigens, some are haemagglutinins H (16 different kinds are
known, from H1 to H16), others are neuraminidases N (9
different kinds are known, from N1 to N9).
There are 23 known H-N associations (of which 15 are found
in birds) out of 135 potential ones.  A slight modification or re-
combination of viruses of different lineages is sufficient for the
creation of new and potentially virulent strains.  On numerous
occasions (e.g., in Italy and Mexico) H7N1 and the H5N2
strains, which initially were not very pathogenic, became
extremely virulent in just a few months.
7 I THE PATHOGENIC AGENT
Traditional brooder house
in Vietnam, 2005
Vincent Porphyre, © Cirad
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The pathogenic power of H
Numerous strains of the avian influenza virus, including the
subtypes H5, H7, and H9, exist completely unnoticed in wild
and domestic bird populations.  In contrast, certain strains
belonging to the same type may be very virulent and provoke
up to 100% mortality.  The pathogenicity of a strain is linked
closely to the ability of haemagglutinin to cleave into two
functional subunits required for the virus to penetrate the
cell.  This catalysis is facilitated in highly pathogenic strains
by the presence of basic amino acids duplicated at the
cleavage site, rendering it more accessible to the enzymes
involved.  Genome sequencing of the cleavage site reveals
the pathogenic character of an avian influenza virus strain.
A fragile virus?
If it is protected by moist organic material, the virus can
survive well in the environment.  It remains infectious for 4
days at 22°C, 30 days at 0°C in contaminated water, and 40
days in poultry droppings.  However, it may be destroyed by
exposing it to temperatures of at least 70°C for one second
during the preparation of food products (meat, eggs…).
Traditional local commerce of hunted wild birds in Mopti, Mali, 2006
Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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A family of
unpredictable viruses
The large H.N. family
The avian influenza viruses are programmed to make use of
cells in the respiratory and digestive tracts to multiply.  They
provoke epizootic outbreaks that are well known to
veterinarians.  Apart from the H9 subtype virulent in poultry,
the H5 and H7 subtypes currently are host to the most
aggressive viral strains.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza
outbreaks in the world
1959 Scotland H5N1
1963 England H7N3
1966 Ontario (Canada)  H5N9
1976 Victoria (Australia) H7N7
1979 Germany H7N7
1979 England H7N7
1983 Pennsylvania (USA) H5N2
1983 Ireland H5N8
1985 Victoria (Australia) H7N3
1994 Queensland (Australia) H7N3
1994 Mexico City (Mexico) H5N2
1994 Pakistan H7N3
1997 New S. Wales (Australia) H7N4
1997 Hong Kong H5N1
1997 Italy H5N2
1999 Italy H7N1
2002 Hong Kong H5N1
2002 Chile H7N3
2003 Netherlands H7N7
2004 Pakistan H7N3
2004 Texas (USA) H5N2
2004 British Columbia (Canada) H7N3
2004  South Africa  H5N2
2005 Southeast Asia H5N1
2005 China H5N1
2005 Romania H5N1
2006 Turkey H5N1
2006 50 countries infected by H5N1
9 I THE PATHOGENIC AGENT
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The genetic drift strategy
Type A avian influenza viruses are varied and unpredictable
because they use a short term survival tactic.  Through slight
genetic modifications, they escape the immune defenses of a
host while exploiting for as long as possible the population
vulnerable to the infection.
Two mechanisms at play
Genetic drift occurs through an accumulation of replication
errors in a slow process to which organisms may adapt
themselves.  It is responsible for an antigen shift that allows a
virus to partially escape a host's immune response or to
progressively adapt to a new host species.
In contrast, genetic reassortment occurs when two viruses
trade genetic material, which is only possible if the same cell
is infected simultaneously by these two viruses.
Feared combinations
Genetic reassortment can have two consequences: a major
antigenic modification and the acquisition of new
characteristics of virulence or adaptation to a host species.
The combination of these two consequences resulted in the
emergence of the viruses responsible for the Asian (1957) and
Hong Kong (1968) flu in humans, springing from a
recombination of a human and an avian virus.  Three of the
genes in the 1957 H2N2 virus came from an avian influenza
virus and the 5 other segments came from a H1N1 virus
derived from the virus responsible for the Spanish flu
(1918-1919).
Sacred ibis flying in the sky over Chad, 2006 – Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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From birds
to other animals 
All birds are concerned
The disease has been well described among domestic birds
such as turkeys and chickens.  However, all domestic and wild
birds (including migratory ducks and geese) probably are
vulnerable to the HPAI H5N1 virus.  Migratory ducks play an
important role in the spread of the virus across far distances.
Water that is contaminated by infected bird droppings can
serve as a passive vector for the most vulnerable species such
as swans, which should be considered more as victims of the
disease than as responsible for its spread.  Domestic birds
might become contaminated through contact with infected
wild birds or water polluted with the HPAI H5N1 virus.
Conversely, wild birds might become contaminated through
contact with infected domestic birds or water polluted with
their droppings or by domestic by-products that commonly
are used as feed on fish farms in Asia and Africa.
And ostrich?
Ostrich farming has been developed world wide.  In South
Africa, an epizootic of influenza among these birds caused a
direct (mortality) and indirect (the interdiction of exports)
losses estimated at several tens of millions of euros in 2004.
Domestic and wild ducks on a rice paddy in Madagascar, 2005 – Renaud Lancelot,
© Cirad
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When the flu is shared
Under certain circumstances, viruses with avian origins may
infect mammals (pigs, horses…), or even humans.
Nonetheless, this infection generally remains invisible.  Wild
(tigers in Thailand) or domestic (cats) felines have fallen ill or
died after ingesting birds that died of avian influenza, or by
having close and repeated contact with sick birds or their
droppings.  To date, such events are rare and there is little
evidence that cats play a significant role in the transmission of
the pathogenic H5N1 virus.  However, genetic evolutions
(mutation, reassortment) may allow a virus to adapt itself to a
new host species.  Great vigilance is required faced with this
risk of crossing the species barrier.
Commercial exchanges and hygiene
All evidence indicates that uncontrolled commercial
movements and a lack of hygiene are much more effective
than migratory birds at rapidly transmitting the virus to
numerous farms in a given region.  Examples are the
movement and markets of live birds and the importation of
hatching eggs or of chicks of suspect origins.  However, the
respective contribution of wild birds and of commercial
exchanges is difficult to quantify : it is a research question
which several teams are studying actively.
Sample taken from a red-tailed godwit, traditionally hunted in Mali, 2006
Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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Avian influenza in poultry
Highly variable symptoms
The virus penetrates a bird's respiratory and intestinal
membranes to infect the cells which will insure its replication.
The incubation period is short: 3 to 5 days in general, although
it may be up to 3 weeks. This upper limit was retained in
international regulation for the exchanges of birds and bird
products.
With highly pathogenic H.N. viruses, the acute forms are
common: in 90% of the cases, the birds suffer a septicemic
attack and die within one or two days.  With extreme forms,
symptoms may be observed in isolation or in various
associations, including general (loss of appetite, prostration…),
cutaneous (oedema, congestion, hemorrhage in the combs and
wattles), respiratory (respiratory difficulties, rattle, cough),
digestive (diarrhea with occasional white droppings, possibly
hemorrhagic), and neurological (poor motor coordination, wing
paralysis, stiff neck...) signs.
In subacute forms, birds suffer from respiratory symptoms
(swelling of orbital sinuses, respiratory difficulty, cough) and
cease to lay eggs.  Mortality rates still may be high, differing
from what is observed in mild cases: slight respiratory
symptoms and a reduction in egg laying.  Finally, forms showing
no visible symptoms are frequent among wild birds.
Veterinary and conservation agents discussing a sampling frame to detect avian
influenza viruses in migrating birds in Mali, 2006 - Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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Vulnerable domestic species
Chickens and turkeys are the most vulnerable domestic
species.  Pheasants, quail, guinea fowl, and ostriches are
susceptible, as are geese and ducks.  In enzootic zones,
numerous domestic and wild species (chickens, geese,
ducks…) might be reservoirs for the H5N1 virus, a small
proportion of birds (0.1% to 2%) seeming capable of
harboring the virus without showing symptoms.  These birds
might thus contaminate other birds.  Pigs, horses, cats, and
people may become infected by H5N1 and other avian flu
viruses.  In Asian zoos, carnivores accidentally fed chickens
infected with H5N1 developed severe pneumonia and died.
In addition to their own specific influenza viruses, pigs also
may harbor viruses of both human and avian origin (a situation
seen in China in 2004 and in Indonesia in 2005).
Consequently, it is important to avoid contact between pigs
and poultry to reduce the risk of the emergence of a hybrid
virus potentially dangerous to man.
From beak to snout: mixed farming of pigs and chickens in
Vietnam, 2005 – Vincent Porphyre, © Cirad
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Avian flu in man
A very rare disease
Human cases remain exceptional: man is naturally resistant to
avian flu.  Repeated and close contact with diseased or dead
birds is necessary for infection to take place.  Humans are
infected through their eyes, developing a generally benign
form of conjunctivitis (the case of the H7N7 virus in the
Netherlands in 2003), or through the deep inhalation of
particles that may provoke a severe respiratory infection.  The
incubation period lasts between 1 and 2 weeks before the first
symptoms appear: high fever, headaches, muscular pain,
fatigue, cough, and respiratory difficulty.  In certain cases,
these symptoms evolve rapidly into acute respiratory distress
that can lead to death.
The human victims
As of August 2006, the virus has provoked 241 confirmed
human cases of avian flu in Southeast Asia, Turkey, Iraq, and
Egypt, with a mortality rate of approximately 60% (the
proportion of deaths among diagnosed cases).  These cases
must be considered in the context of the hundreds of millions
of people exposed.  It may thus be affirmed that the
transmission of H5N1 from poultry to man is an exceptional
phenomena that always is linked to extremely poor hygienic
and sanitary conditions.  In contrast, human influenza viruses
are the indirect cause of several hundred thousand deaths
each year around the world.
• 1997: 18 people are infected with the H5N1 virus in Hong
Kong, 6 die.
• 1999 and 2003: the H9N2 virus is found in three people in
Hong Kong, they develop only minor symptoms.
• 2003: the H7N2 virus is discovered in a man suffering from
a severe flu in the state of New York (USA).
• 2003: the H7N7 virus infects several dozen people in the
Netherlands who were in contact with sick birds, provoking
conjunctivitis.  A veterinarian dies following infection from
the virus.
• Since the resurgence of the H5N1 epizootic in Southeast
Asia in 2003, 241 people have been infected, of which 141
have died (August 2006).  This figure evolves from week to
week, the most frequent cases currently being found in
Indonesia which is having difficulty controlling the epizootic.
The last reported cases of deaths outside of Asia were in
Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt.
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From person to person
The transmission of the HPAI H5N1 virus from an infected
person to a healthy individual is extremely rare.  A substantial
mutation of the existing HPAI H5N1 virus strains would be
required for this to be more frequent.  Its occurrence would
change the nature of the disease and considerably increase
the risk of a pandemic caused by the mutant virus.
Poultry market vendor in Vietnam, 2003 – Jean-Charles Maillard,
© Cirad
Plucking captured wild bird in Mopti, Mali, 2006 – Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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Once upon a time,
there was the Spanish Flu
The Spanish Flu of 1918-1919
The culprit H1N1 virus killed over 40 million people
between 1918 and 1919, a total that may be compared to
the 8.3 million soldiers killed between 1914 and 1918
during World War I.  The virus began in China and first
circulated through Europe and the United States of America
onboard troop transports, then reached Southeast Asia and
Africa through land, sea, and air routes.  Initially, it was not
particularly deadly; the people who fell ill often recovered
after suffering only a few days of fever.  In a second wave,
the virus became ten times more dangerous to the point of
becoming lethal among healthy people between the ages of
15 and 35; in contrast, "ordinary" flu statistically affects the
youngest and oldest in a population.  At the time, it was
thought that older people were spared because they had
experienced the flu of 1889-1891 and survived.
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Some authors believe that the lethal character of the virus
may have been acquired on pig farms located on the Great
Plains of North America.  Deaths were caused by severe
primary viral pneumonia that developed very fast (2 days),
as well as by secondary bacterial infections caused by
Haemophilus influenza, a bacteria species involved in
deadly pneumonias and pleurisy.
The name, Spanish Flu, is due to a rumor that the source of
contamination in Europe was canned food imported from
Spain that supposedly was poisoned by German spies.
During the pandemic, 25 to 30% of the worldwide
population caught the flu.  Life expectancy dropped 10
years in the space of only a few months.  India counted 10
million dead.  The United States of America lost 500,000 of
its citizens, or more than the cumulated losses from the two
World Wars, the Korean War, and the war in Vietnam.  In
France, 400,000 young adults died.  Certain Polynesian
islands lost 20% of their population while at the same time
60% of Inuits disappeared.  Wearing face masks became a
daily reality at work and on public transport.
Pigs also were victims of the epidemic, either due to their
role in the appearance of the virus, or by transmission from
infected people.
Extracts from a medical thesis (1919)
"Despite active treatment: bleeding in the beginning, daily
colloidal silver, camphor oil, strychnine, cold packs, fixation
abscess, subcutaneous injections of oxygen, by the sixteenth
day, the patient succumbed to the flu."
The Spanish Flu rediscovered in 2005
American researchers recreated in a laboratory a virus
similar to an avian H1N1 virus.  They used a Spanish flu
virus discovered in the bodies of Inuits which had been
conserved in frozen Alaskan soil for nearly 90 years.  The
researchers were able to verify the virus' highly pathogenic
nature on cultures of human pulmonary cells.
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Short questions
Brief responses
Why cannot people be vaccinated with the vaccine used for poultry?
Each vaccine is adapted to the species for which it is destined. The immune system of birds
is different from man: a vaccine that works for birds will not necessarily be effective for
people. In addition, the vaccine used in several parts of the world (e.g., Mexico) against avian
influenza only provides immunity for a short time (several weeks) in vaccinated birds.
Why get vaccinated against human flu if this will not protect against avian flu?
(1) Because the human flu virus remains by far more wide spread among people than that of
avian flu, (2) to avoid having someone accidentally infected by avian flu also become infected
with human flu, which would facilitate the emergence of a potentially dangerous hybrid virus,
and (3) to facilitate a differential diagnosis in the case of flu symptoms.
Bird flu or avian influenza?
The term avian influenza is preferable because it is less easily confused with the human
disease (the flu) and it does not imply that birds are infected with a disease that resembles
the human flu.
What does influenza mean?
Etymologically, influenza comes from the Italian «influenza di freddo», or influence of the cold.
No distinction is made from a banal cold.
Are all viruses dangerous?
No, most are inoffensive or benign. Numerous types of influenza viruses pose no threat to
people. Certain other viruses known as bacteriophages are used as biological tools to destroy
pathogenic bacteria.
How many duplicated viruses can a living infected cell produce?
A sole virus that has infected one cell can lead to the production of several hundred new
viruses in two or three days.
Has the H5N1 virus evolved since 1997, the date when research for a vaccine began?
Yes, it is continually evolving.
What is infectiosity?
The capacity of a pathogenic agent to establish itself in a host of a given species in order to
multiply there.
What is an epizootic?
The sudden increase in the number of animals infected by a disease in a given region and
during a given period of time.
What is an enzootic?
An infectious disease affecting one or several species of a region that does not tend to spread
and which is permanently present at certain times of the year.
When does one speak of an epizootic or an epidemic?
The term epidemic is generic and may be applied to diseases affecting people, animals, and
plants. The term epizootic refers specifically to an epidemic affecting animals. It is preferable
to use this term in the case of avian influenza to avoid the suggestion that the disease is
contagious between people, which has not been observed to date.
Should one speak of a panzootic?
Commonly the term panzootic refers to animal epidemics and the term pandemic is used for
human epidemics. In the beginning of 2006, the H5N1 panzootic was confirmed, the H5N1
pandemic is still only feared.
What is a pandemic vaccine?
A vaccine against a virus capable of provoking a large scale epidemic.
Why would a genetic recombination of avian and human viruses be dangerous?
Genetic recombination may take place in a human or in an intermediary host such as a pig. The
sudden change of antigens in a virus that has been recombined and adapted to a new species
creates the conditions for a major epidemic in a population that has no pre-existing immunity.
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Virulent or contagious?
A virulent virus provokes a serious disease in the host. A contagious virus is transmitted easily
from one individual to another. A contagious virus may not be very virulent. A virulent and
contagious virus always is to be greatly feared.
What became of the Spanish Flu virus?
Very mild pathogenic forms of viruses resembling the one that caused the deaths of 40 million
people between 1918 and 1919 continue to circulate among wild bird populations without
having changed considerably.
Is there an estimate of how many chickens there are in the world?
Approximately 100 billion.
The H5N1 virus is an occasional pathogenic agent in man. Are there others?
Out of 1,400 viruses, bacteria, fungus, champignons, protozoa and worms harmful to the
health of people, 60% are shared with animals.
Are more and more pathogenic agents affecting people?
Not necessarily, but it is true that new research methods has enabled the description of about
forty such pathogenic agents since 1980 (for example, the Creutzfeld-Jakob disease prion, the
SIDA virus, the SARS coronavirus).
What is behind the increase in health risks?
An acceleration of trade, environmental change, global warming, an increase of
immunodeficient populations (elderly or under treatment), a decrease in hygiene.
How many chickens can coexist on one industrial farm?
Up to 1.25 million individuals in California (USA).
Did the current avian crisis begin in 1997 or 2003?
In 1997, a HPAI H5N1 virus caused disease in both man and poultry in Hong Kong. Eighteen
human cases were recorded, 6 of which were fatal. In December 2002 and January 2003, new
outbreaks were reported in Hong Kong in poultry and wild birds. At the end of 2003 and
beginning of 2004, multiple outbreaks occurred in Southern Korea and Indonesia, then in
Vietnam, Japan, Taipea China, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and China. Different strains of HPAI
H5N1 probably had been circulating in South-East Asia for several years and were only
reported in some places. A conjunction of triggering factors such as a cool and wet climate,
increased density of domestic birds, and more intense commercial exchanges (New Year feast)
were probably at the origin of the epizootic.
Is the clandestine poultry trade widespread?
It is substantial but difficult to quantify. It was probably behind the dissemination of avian
influenza from Nigeria to Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and the Ivory Coast.
I caught bird flu, will I recover?
Poultry farmers have caught avian influenza and spontaneously recovered. Others died after
a tardy diagnosis and a lack of support for vital functions during hospitalization. For those who
fall ill, an antiviral treatment taken at the start of the infection improves one’s chances of
recovery.
How many deaths have there been in 2 years?
One hundred and forty one deaths (17 August 2006) spread across a dozen countries, out of
several million people that might have become infected. This figure is far lower than the
number of deaths due to ordinary human flu (several hundred thousand per year worldwide).
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And Asia?
The People's Republic of China recently decided to
restructure its veterinary services to conform to OIE (World
Organization for Animal Health) recommendations.  This
change resulted in an increase in the declaration of avian
influenza outbreaks: from August 2005 to April 2006, 28
declarations (chickens, partridge, ducks, geese) were made to
the OIE in 14 provinces, including Tibet and Inner Mongolia,
leading to the death or the culling of 400 000 birds.  As of April
2006, 18 human cases of infection were confirmed since the
beginning of the epizootic, of which 12 were fatal.  Recent
studies indicate that the H5N1 virus started from an enzootic
zone in the south of the country and was able to contaminate
other regions of China and the world due to both the
commercial movement of poultry and poultry products and the
migration of wild birds.
Flight of white-faced whistling ducks accompanied by summer blue winged teal
and comb ducks, 2006 - Alexandre Caron, © Cirad 
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And the Middle East?
And Turkey?
As the eastern region of Turkey borders on several countries,
there are two conflicting hypotheses explaining the
introduction of H5N1: it either was due to migrating birds,
Turkey lying along one of the principal migration paths of birds
nesting in Siberia, or to uncontrolled commercial movements.
During the first trimester of 2006, outbreaks among animals
were observed in 7 provinces.  Twelve cases among humans
were confirmed, of which four led to death.  Human cases
were reported at about the same period in Iraq, but no
information was available regarding the situation among
animals.  In August 2006, several months passed without a
new human or animal case in Turkey, while several outbreaks
affected Egypt (14 human cases – the last one in May 2006, of
which 6 were fatal), the Gaza Strip, Iran, Israel, and Jordan.
Industrial battery of laying hens, 2002 - Vincent Porphyre, © Cirad
Destruction after sampling of bird carcasses and sampling materials, 2006
Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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And Africa?
By August 2006, 8 African countries were known to have been
infected by the HPAI H5N1 virus: Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan.  This
virus was introduced to Africa either through the commercial
importation of eggs or day-old chicks from infected countries,
or through migrating birds for whom Nigeria and Egypt are
important winter destinations.  Uncontrolled commercial
movements between African states also should be
considered.  It is probable that the wide spread Egyptian
epizootic (14 governorates infected by the end of August
2006) caused the contamination of Palestine, Jordan, and
Israel.  It is feared that the infection, starting from outbreaks in
Egypt and Nigeria, will propagate itself and spread through
countries of northern, western, and eastern Africa, in other
words, throughout the entire African continent and the Arabian
peninsula.
The H5N1 virus is likely to cause heavy economic losses as
much at the national level as at that of rural African families.
The promiscuity of poultry and people in the villages increases
the risk of human cases.  The diversity of the ecosystems
infected leads to the fear that the disease may become
endemic, meaning that it may quietly circulate only to
suddenly remerge given favorable climatic conditions or an
encounter with an animal population receptive and vulnerable
to the disease.  The recommended control measures are
slaughtering at an outbreak area and vaccination around the
contamination point.  These measures require the coordinated
mobilization of local populations (supported by wide scale
information campaigns), countries, and international
assistance.
Industrial poultry battery, 2006 - Vincent Porphyre, © Cirad
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And Western Europe?
The H5N1 virus was introduced into Western Europe by wild
birds coming from the East during the winter of 2005-2006.
Only two commercial turkey farms were affected during this
period: one in France and one in Germany.  Past episodes of
avian influenza in Europe allows one to think that official
veterinary services will be able to control the health situation.
Likewise, it should be possible to avoid the contamination of
humans, or at the least limit it to exceptional cases.  On the
other hand, the economic losses in the commercial poultry
sector already are enormous.  The persistence of outbreaks in
Eastern Europe and the spread of the epidemic in the Middle
East and Africa will enable the menace to hover over all of
Western Europe for several years.
Poultry farm above a fish pond in Cambodia, 2002 - Vincent Porphyre, © Cirad
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Active prevention
among animals
In relation to poultry
• Avoid contact between domestic poultry and wild birds,
protect watering holes and feed troughs with fences or nets.
• Quarantine (the optimal period is 3 weeks) birds recently
introduced or reintroduced (ex: unsold animals returning
from markets) before mixing them with the flock on the farm.
• When there is an abnormally high mortality rate among bird
stock, immediately alert the closest veterinarian or veterinary
services.
• Farming birds in single-age flocks allows better control of
disease in general.
• Although the advantages of vaccination in general are well
known, the ideal vaccine against H5N1 does not yet exist.  In
effect, certain vaccines in circulation were made from an
inactive strain of H5N2.
- Cross protection with the H5N1 virus therefore is not
perfect, and the inactive character of the vaccine leads to
an immunity of short duration.  To obtain a satisfactory level
of protection, two initial injections are required, followed by
regular booster injections among birds with long life spans
(laying hens, breeding birds).  This treatment is expensive
and involves repeated handling of the animals.  Such
practices are possible on modern farms, but are
problematic for smallholders in Asia or Africa with free-
ranging birds.  
- The vaccine protects the bird against the disease, but does
not guarantee that the wild HPAI H5N1 virus will not
replicate itself in the digestive system of the bird if the
vaccinated bird was exposed to the infection.  Such a bird
could then disseminate the virus and contaminate other
birds that were not vaccinated.  
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Poultry stall in a
Vietnamese market, 2003 
Jean-Charles Maillard,
© Cirad
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In relation to other animals
• Separate the different species raised on the farm (e.g.,
ducks, pigs).
• Avoid contact with other animals, notably dogs, cats, and
rodents.
• Follow closely the recommendations of the veterinary
services concerning confinement and vaccination.
In relation to material, equipment,
and vehicles
• Do not allow soiled material, equipment, or vehicles to enter
the farm.
• Material and equipment should be cleaned and disinfected
regularly (egg trays, cages…).
• Avoid using materials that are difficult to disinfect (wood,
fibers…).
• Control the origin of water and food that may be a source of
contamination.
Donkey transporting
a nomadic Peul
shepherd's camp
in Niger, 2006
Alexandre Caron,
© Cirad
Meeting of pigs, chickens, and a dog over waste water in Madagascar, 2005 -
Renaud Lancelot, © Cirad
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Active prevention
among people
In relation to people
• Reinforce customary hygiene rules, such as washing hands
and food.
• Hunters should not handle dead wild birds with their bare
hands.
• At risk professionals (poultry farmers, veterinarians, livestock
technicians…) should have protective equipment at their
disposal (gloves, masks, goggles, overalls) and should use
them whenever there is the slightest risk.  In case of
exposure to suspect birds or products, they should consult
a doctor without delay.
• Leave specific clothes (shoes, jackets…) at one's work site,
and wash equipment regularly.
• In the kitchen, wear gloves to pluck, clean, and cut up birds.
Wash hands with soap before and after handling poultry
carcasses.  The consumption of poultry meat requires
proper cooking (70°C for at least one second in the heart of
the meat); the same principal applies to eggs.
• Forbid access to bird-stock buildings to people not working
on the farm who could contaminate birds through their
clothes, shoes, or hands (veterinarians, technicians…).
Protective clothing must be put at their disposal.
• Footbaths (to disinfect feet and shoes) must be available at
the entrance of each building and be maintained
(disinfectants renewed every other day).
• Require hand washing before and after entering areas where
animals are kept.
Transport of poultry in a
cage on a motorcycle in
Vietnam, 2002
Doan Hong, Projet PCP -
Malica / Paule Moustier
of the Fruit and
Horticulture Department
(Flhor) © Cirad
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Stringent bio-security
Even in the absence of an outbreak or of suspect cases,
sanitary precautions must be strictly observed along the entire
production chain, from farms or cooperatives to
slaughterhouses, without overlooking food preparation
factories or means of transport.  For example, eggs must not
be sold less than 4 days after being laid in order to leave time
for possible diseases in incubation to manifest.  If such is the
case, this allows the eggs to be withdrawn from the
distribution chain.  When the risk of avian influenza is high,
these measures are reinforced.
Antiviral treatments
Access to antiviral medicines is difficult for populations in
developing countries – the people most vulnerable to avian flu.
If a human case is suspected, the sick person must be taken
immediately to a hospital as the antiviral treatment is only
effective if it is administered within several hours of the first
sign of symptoms.
Flight of whistling ducks in Niger, 2006 - Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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Control of contagious
outbreaks
When an outbreak is confirmed
• Movement of animals is forbidden (put under quarantine).
• Movement of people is restricted: limited possibility to leave
the site with a required stop at a control post and
disinfection of the means of transport. 
• Complete slaughter of birds present and incineration and/or
burial of dead or slaughtered animals and their products.
• Complete disinfection of buildings, equipment, and infected
areas.
• Complete sanitary isolation for 21 days.
Laying hen farm in Madagascar, 2006 - Renaud Lancelot, © Cirad
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An infected zone
Within a 3 to 5 km radius (depending on the concentration of
poultry present in the zone and the associated epidemiological
risks):
• Complete slaughter of the poultry present in the zone where
compensation is available: compensation measures are
necessary if the livestock farmers concerned are to accept
the slaughter of their birds instead of hiding them and
contributing to the maintenance of the infection.
and/or
• Vaccination of birds.
• Prohibition of moving birds and their products.
• Limits on the movement of people (anyone exiting the zone
must pass through a control post and the means of
transportation must be disinfected).
Protection zone
Within a 5 to 10 km radius (or farther):
• Vaccination of birds.
• Prohibition of moving birds and their products.
• Limits on the movement of people (anyone exiting the zone
must pass through a control post and the means of
transportation must be disinfected).
Surveillance zone
On the remainder of the territory:
• Prohibition of bird markets and other forms of bird gatherings
(races, fairs, exhibitions…).
• Reinforcement of the surveillance of poultry farms.
• Reinforcement of on-farm bio-security measures.
• Confinement of birds to buildings that allow a complete
separation of domestic and wild birds.
• No introduction of hatching eggs, day-old chicks or any
other bird whose health status is not certified by qualified
veterinary services.
• Strict restrictions on off-farm contacts - people, material,
feed, vehicles - accompanied by systematic cleaning and
disinfecting measures (footbaths, disinfectant mats,
disinfection of egg trays…).
• Raising birds in single-age flocks and sanitary isolation of
flocks to avoid the eventual transmission of the virus from
one group to another.
• Reinforcement of controls on the movement of people and
animals within the interior of the country and on the frontiers.
In each national preparedness plan, the limits of zones to be
considered, as well as the length of the enforcement of
health measures, are defined by the health authorities.
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To destroy the virus 
What kills the virus
The external lipidic layer of the viral shell is destroyed by
detergents such as soapy water or particular hydro-alcoholic
disinfectants.  Simple rinsing with water is insufficient because
the virus survives well in humidity, cold water, and at moderate
temperatures.  Bird droppings represent the greatest danger
as the virus can remain infectious in them for over one month.
A convalescent bird may excrete the virus in its ocular and
nasal secretions up to 30 days after the infection.
Floating market on the river Niger in Mopti, Mali, 2006 - Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
Geese driven by a small shepherd in Madagascar, 2005 - Renaud Lancelot, © Cirad
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The price of bird flu
An exorbitant cost
To evaluate the cost of avian influenza, the following must be
taken into account • the direct mortality from disease and
culling, both of which induce heavy losses for poultry
farmers • the cost of surveillance and control (culling,
disinfecting, quarantines, surveillance networks, analyses,
vaccinations,...) • compensation for poultry farmers in the
case of mandatory culling  • consumer reticence in western
countries to eat poultry, aggravating the crisis in the poultry
sector • restrictions on or the prohibition of poultry and
poultry product exports • the collapse of tourism in affected
countries • damage to their long term image.
Vietnam estimates having lost in this way 200 millions euros
in 2004, or 0.5 percent of its gross domestic product.
Egg laying hens raised in cages in Madagascar, 2006 - Renaud Lancelot, © Cirad
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The spread over time
and space
Countries infected by H5N1 virus
from 2003 to 2004
Countries infected by H5N1 virus
from 2003 to 2005
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Countries infected by H5N1 virus
from 2003 to october 2006
The disadvantage of this country-by-country map is that it
makes it seem as if an entire national territory is infected when
infectious outbreaks are often scattered.  The advantage is
that it shows the rapid geographic spread of the HPAI H5N1
virus.
Migrating birds,
vectors or victims?
Recent studies showed that in some enzootic regions certain
aquatic migratory birds, ducks in particular, were carriers of
the H5N1 virus without presenting symptoms.  The same virus
was found on dead birds far from the closest outbreak of
HPAI.  However, it is certain that commercial exchanges of
domesticated birds and their products (eggs, chicks, meat,
feathers, and droppings) play a considerable role in the
diffusion of the virus in the short and long term.  Additional
work is needed to identify the degree to which wild migratory
and sedentary birds contribute to transmission compared to
the movement of domesticated birds and poultry products
linked to human activity. 
211106079LL  23/11/06  16:33  Page 34
The countries directly
and indirectly concerned
Country First sign Species Farm 
(d/m/y) infected type
South Korea 11/12/2003 Chicken (breeding) Industrial 
Indonesia 11/12/2003 Hen Farmyard 
Vietnam 27/12/2003 Chicken (breeding) Industrial 
Cambodia 11/01/2004 Hen Industrial 
Japan 12/01/2004 Hen Industrial
Hong-Kong 19/01/2004 Peregrine falcon Wild
Laos 19/01/2004 Hen Industrial
Thailand 20/01/2004 Hen Industrial
China 23/01/2004 Hen, chicken, duck, Farmyard 
goose, pigeon
Malaysia 07/08/2004 Hen, chicken, goose, duck Farmyard
Russia 18/07/2005 Hen, turkey, duck, goose Farmyard 
Kazakhstan 22/07/2005 Duck, goose Farmyard 
Mongolia 02/08/2005 Duck, goose, swan Wild
Turkey 01/10/2005 Turkey Farmyard 
Romania 04/10/2005 Hen, duck Farmyard 
Croatia 19/10/2005 Swan Wild
Ukraine 25/11/2005 Chicken, goose Farmyard
Nigeria 10/01/2006 Hen Industrial
Iraq 18/01/2006 Chicken, hen, goose, duck, Farmyard 
wild birds and wild
Azerbaijan 29/01/2006 Wild birds Wild 
Greece 30/01/2006 Swan Wild
Italy 01/02/2006 Mute swan Wild 
Iran 02/02/2006 Swan Wild
Bulgaria 03/02/2006 Swan Wild
Hungary 04/02/2006 Mute swan Wild 
Germany 08/02/2006 Swan, goshawk Wild 
Slovenia 11/02/2006 Mute swan Wild 
Austria 13/02/2006 Swan Wild
France 13/02/2006 Wild duck Wild 
Niger 13/02/2006 Chicken, duck Farmyard
Myanmar (Burma) 13/02/2006 Hen, quail Farmyard 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 16/02/2006 Swan Wild 
Egypt 17/02/2006 Chicken, hen, goose, duck, Farmyard, industrial
wild birds and wild 
Slovakia 17/02/2006 Smew, peregrine falcon Wild
India 18/02/2006 Chicken, hen Farmyard, industrial 
Cameroon 21/02/2006 Duck Farmyard 
Georgia 23/02/2006 Swan Wild
Pakistan 23/02/2006 Hen (breeding) Industrial 
Sweden 24/02/2006 Mallard duck Breeding 
Switzerland 26/02/2006 Common merganser Wild
Burkina Faso 01/03/2006 Guinea fowl Farmyard 
Serbia and Montenegro 01/03/2006 Swan Wild 
Poland 02/03/2006 Swan Wild
Afghanistan 02/03/2006 Turkey, chicken Farmyard 
Albania 07/03/2006 Chicken Farmyard 
Denmark 14/03/2006 Tufted duck, swan Wild
Israel 16/03/2006 Turkey Industrial 
Czech Republic 20/03/2006 Mute swan Wild 
Jordan 23/03/2006 Turkey, chicken Farmyard 
United Kingdom 30/03/2006 Swan Wild
Côte d’Ivoire 30/03/2006 Chicken, ducks, hawks Farmyard, wild
Sudan 01/04/2006 Chicken Farmyard
Djibouti 06/04/2006 Chicken Farmyard
Spain 30/06/2006 Great crested grebe Wild
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Countries not yet infected or where test
results are not yet known
While the approximately fifty countries affected by the disease
have suffered its direct negative effects since the beginning of
the plague, the 150 countries thus far disease-free have
experienced indirect effects such as an anticipated drop in the
consumption of poultry that is nevertheless safe, an increase
in health control measures, the stimulation of meat
substitution sectors, the reorientation of tourism, a
strengthening of international solidarity, and an awareness of
globalization.
Wire cages in a Vietnamese market, 2002 - Doan Hong, Project PCP Malica / Paule
Moustier of the Fruit and Horticulture Production Department (Flhor), © Cirad
Purchase of a chicken in Vietnam, 2002 - Doan Hong, Project PCP Malica / Paule
Moustier of the Fruit and Horticulture Production Department (Flhor), © Cirad
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International
mobilization
One hundred countries, in addition to international human and
animal health organizations (including the FAO (1), OIE (2), and
WHO (3)), meeting at a conference in Beijing (China) in January
2006, decided to donate 1.9 billion US dollars for the
prevention of a potential human avian flu pandemic.  The
World Bank, Europe, and the United States respectively are
supposed to provide 500, 121, and 334 million US dollars to
fight avian influenza.  The participants emphasized the
necessity of coordinating activities to consolidate the global
system for disease control and diagnosis.  
This system is organized on three levels:  
A world forum defining veterinary policies, alliances between
international organizations, the private sector, and consumers,
and the establishment of coordinated communication policies
for the management of risk related to animal diseases;  
A regional coordination of efforts in partnership with the
appropriate competent organizations, the FAO, and the OIE to
facilitate the implementation of regional policies and provides
necessary technical support through evaluations of veterinary
services, reinforcement of skills, and the provision of expertise
to countries who request assistance;  
At the national level, an evaluation of veterinary services in
order to prepare the investments required for the prevention
and control of avian influenza and other emerging diseases.  It
also facilitates an evaluation of a country's skills capacities
and the constitution of alliances between official veterinary
services and the private sector (including farmers), for
example in the implementation of national compensation
mechanisms for poultry farmers during culling campaigns
following disease outbreaks.
(1) FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(2) OIE: World Organization for Animal Health
(3) WHO: World Health Organization
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Sanitary restrictions on imports
To avoid introducing avian influenza into a disease-free zone,
all imports of birds or bird products must be inspected by the
veterinary services of the country of origin and destination.
The importer must present an international veterinary
certificate which attests that strict and specific conditions
were met for the departure of the animals or their products.
Depending on the case, these conditions may relate to the
health of the animals, the vaccines used, the nature and
cleanliness of the packaging, the disinfection measures taken,
etc. A precise definition of the norms is given in an
international zoo-sanitary code available on the Internet at the
following address : http://www.oie.int
The certificate is verified at the frontier by border inspection
posts that are entitled to make additional inspections, ask for
complementary analyses, or even consign or destroy the
shipment if there are doubts concerning the documents or if a
health problem is noted upon arrival. 
Indispensable references
• The training guide for veterinary auxiliary workers in Vietnam
«Prevention and control of avian flu in small scale poultry » a 40
page guide illustrated with 14 figures prepared by AVSF
(Agronomes et Vétérinaires sans Frontières / Agronomists and
Veterinarians without Borders), 50 000 copies published. 
http://www.livestockworkinggroup.org
• The documents prepared by the OIE, FAO and AU-IBAR, for
information and training purposes, provides general information on
avian influenza, the species infected, transmission among birds
and between birds and man, farm bio-security, risky practices,
communication, transfer of information, the measures to adopt in
case of suspect and confirmed outbreaks, drawing samples,
avifauna, reference laboratories, culling of poultry and the
destruction of cadavers, disinfection of sites, vaccination,
preparing the management of health crises, sample documents for
the report of suspect outbreaks of HPAI, assistance in deciding on
sanitary culling, attestations for the culling and the destruction of
poultry, poultry vaccines. 
http://www.oie.int/eng/avian_influenza/disease.htm
• The teaching kit prepared by the EISMV (Ecole inter-états des
sciences et de médecine vétérinaires / Interstate School of
Science and Veterinary Medicine) of Dakar (Senegal) includes an
illustrated handbook, pedagogical tools to lead meetings, a
posters guide, prepared responses to frequently asked questions,
monographs on the disease, slides on a CD-ROM, role play audio
messages, and theatrically inspired video spots.  
http://www.refer.sn/eismv
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Lessons from bird flu
Negative repercussions
• Collapse of the poultry sector in affected countries.
• Anticipated consumer recoil in retail markets.
• Loss of revenues for small poultry farmers without insurance.
• Large poultry farmers turning to insurance brokers or to the
State.
• Diversion of compensation allocated to stricken poultry
farmers.
• Reduction in the commercial trade of living material.
• Irrational and pointless destruction of wild birds (nests of
swallows, swans…), abandonment of domestic animals
(birds, cats).
• Mobilization of funds to the detriment of other subjects
receiving less media attention.
• Decrease in tourism.
Positive repercussions
• Evidence of the necessity of training veterinarians in all of the
affected countries.
• Growing awareness of the risks linked to emerging diseases.
• Revival of other meat production sectors.
• Capitalizing on previously scattered knowledge.
• Public consciousness raising on current events.
• Revival of veterinary and medical research.
Blood sample drawn from the wing vein of a hen in Cambodia, 2002 - Vincent
Porphyre, © Cirad
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What has been understood
• It is difficult to draw together the financial, material, and
human resources needed to stop the expansion of a
panzootic even if the country of origin and the concrete
sanitary control measures to be taken are known.
• The media plays an important role in decision making,
particularly in democratic countries.
• It is easy to lose sight of the fact that bird flu is principally an
animal health problem before being, and this is still very
hypothetical, a problem of human public health.
What remains to be studied
Numerous questions still remain concerning the epidemiology
of the H5N1 virus (and of other avian influenza viruses), in
addition to the potential to improve control measures.  The
following list is only indicative and not exhaustive:
• The conditions in which the ordinarily mildly virulent H5N1
virus becomes very aggressive.
• The role of wild birds in the transport of the virus over long
distances.
• The survival of the virus in tropical and temperate
environments when it is protected from direct sunlight, high
temperatures, desiccation, and the aggression of diverse
chemical agents.
• The possible transformation of the virus genome within the
bodies of domestic pigs.
• The impact of avian flu on small farms in Africa.
• The transmission of the virus between domestic and wild
birds.
• The risks linked to commercial trade.
• The modification of the spread of the virus at different scales
(local, national, international).
• Genetic and immunogenetic resistance.   
• The interaction between the virus and host cells.
• The search for new vaccines to better protect domestic and
even wild animals.
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INRA Research Topics
On the viruses
The H5N1 virus displays a large genetic plasticity; some strains
are highly pathogenic while others are harmless in birds.
Research into the interaction of each viral protein with the
cytoplasmic and nuclear membranous components of target
cells and of the host's immune system seeks to better
understand the specificity of the virus and to identify
appropriate vaccinal and therapeutic approaches. This research
is conducted through a study of structures at the molecular
scale to examine, for example, the viral M2 protein, the cellular
surface proteins of avian hosts and their contacts with sialic
acid receptors, as well as the network organization of
hemagglutinin proteins. 
On the hosts
If the entry mechanisms of viruses into host cells are beginning
to be better understood, the interactions between the virus and
the intracellular organelles still are not. In addition to the study
of vulnerable bird species, the study of species with a natural
immunity also is a source of knowledge : resistance to virus entry,
resistance to intracytoplasmic transport, or blocking of virus
excretion after replication within the cell.
On the vaccines
One research avenue on vaccines is the transport of influenza
antigens by viral nanostructures or by Myxoma viruses, herpes
viruses, or by canine adenoviruses.  The success of this
approach depends on several factors :  the immune response to
the selected influenza antigens and the effectiveness of the
vector without undesirable side effects in the targeted host.
Research into Orthomyxoviridae in fish may contribute to an
understanding into delicate tissue and cellular immunity
mechanisms.  
On the dynamics of an epidemic 
Within the framework of research undertaken in collaboration
with several French organizations (INSERM, CIRAD, the Institut
Pasteur and AFSAA), INRA is participating in the surveillance of
sentinel species (man, domestic animals, wild animals) in
Europe as in Asia and Africa, tackling the latter two continents
in cooperation with CIRAD.
In 2006, eight INRA researchers are working full time on joint
research units with CNRS, the French vet schools, and AFSSA.
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Surveillance in wild birds
During the summer and fall of 2005, the HPAI H5N1 virus quickly
spread from South-East Asia to Siberia, then to Eastern and Western
Europe. Two non-exclusive hypotheses might explain this phenomena:
the trade of bird products (live animals, eggs, meat…), or the local and
long-distance transmission by bird migrations. For the latter, many
water birds breed in Eurasia and winter in the sub-Saharan regions of
Africa. In African wetlands, these birds are in close contact with a
variety of Afro-tropical water bird species but the transmission risk
between Eurasia and Africa is poorly understood. A survey was funded
and implemented by the FAO in early 2006 to investigate the carriage
of H5N1 or other HPAI virus strains in wild-bird populations wintering
in Africa. Field activities were coordinated by CIRAD and Wetlands
International. Sampling sites were selected among bird-wintering
areas of major interest (see map). Other sites were added following
H5N1 outbreaks in Egypt, Niger and Burkina Faso. Most field
operations were conducted between January and March 2006 in
collaboration with international conservation and research
organisations, NGOs, hunting associations, and safari operators. The
target bird species were selected from families previously identified as
AI reservoirs (ducks, waders, gulls, etc.). About 5,000 samples were
collected in 13 countries: cloacal swabs (birds shot and provided by
hunters, netted birds) and fresh droppings at roosting areas. Most
were shipped to Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie
(Italy), a FAO/OIE reference laboratories for AI.
No HPAI virus was
detected, nor was any
evidence of the
circulation of H5N1
viruses in wild birds,
including in countries
that had experienced
recent outbreaks. This
result should be
interpreted cautiously
due to the small size of
the sample compared
to the millions of water
birds in the target
population. It is
coherent with the
absence of H5N1 virus
reported by surveillance programmes in European countries, and with
the very low prevalence of H5N1 virus reported so far in healthy wild
bird populations in China. A new wildlife survey is implemented by the
FAO in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa during the boreal
winter of 2006-2007 to bring new evidence for the role - or the lack of
a role - of wild birds in the dissemination of HPAI viruses. The first
results are expected in November 2006.
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From fear to hope
Six reasons to fear a mixed
human-avian virus
if
• the hybrid virus becomes regularly mortal for man,
• the hybrid virus is revealed to be highly contagious between
people,
• the specific vaccine is not available in time or in sufficient
quantities,
• virus prevention is discovered to be less effective than
foreseen,
• the world is not ready to fully react in time,
• new diseases add themselves to the effects of the virus
which may facilitate the action of other pathogenic agents or
engender the economic collapse of sectors.
Smoking of whistling ducks in the bush in Chad, 2006 - Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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Six reasons for hope 
because
• other outbreaks of avian influenza ended by themselves,
• scientists are proposing measures to end the crisis,
• the initial outbreaks were controlled,
• new therapies will be proposed,
• natural forms of resistance will appear,
• avian influenza will be controlled before the fatal viral
mutation materializes.
Attempt to capture a domestic duck in Niger, 2006 - Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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The concrete actions
in which CIRAD
is engaged
Before 2005
• Technical support, training, and epidemiological surveillance
and support missions in Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, China);
• Participation in national and international meetings and in
the OFFLU network (Global Scientific Network for the
Control of Avian Influenza) jointly created in April 2005 by the
OIE and the FAO. These activities continue in 2006. 
• Participation in training programs within the framework of
technical cooperation projects (TCP) in Asia.
Since 2006
• Contribution to technical cooperation projects (TCP) against
avian influenza set up by the FAO to benefit the countries of
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa through:
- capacity reinforcement of veterinary services in
epidemiological surveillance networks of domestic and
wild birds and risk analysis, working in collaboration with
the Royal Veterinary College of London;
- an epidemiological study of the transport of the H5N1 virus
by wild avifauna in collaboration with Wetlands
International, the ONCFS (National Office for Hunting and
Wild Fauna) and the veterinary and wild fauna services of
the countries involved.
Biometric measurements on birds
hunted in Burkina Faso, 2006
François Lamarque, © Cirad
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• Acquisition of equipment and skills for the molecular
diagnosis of avian influenza in partnership with AFSSA
(French Agency for Food Health Security), funded by the
Languedoc-Roussillon region;
• Research grants funded by the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the European Union, in collaboration with French,
European, African and Asian institutions and scientists,
aiming to achieve: 
- a better understanding of epidemiological cycles and the
virus flows between bird communities,
- risk analysis and modeling of the disease spread in time
and space,
- economic and social management of health crises and the
risks linked to the reconstruction of the poultry sector.
A researcher preparing a sample in order to identify the H5N1 virus in Burkina
Faso, 2006 - François Lamarque, © Cirad
211106079LL  23/11/06  16:33  Page 46
For further
information
French scientific organization sites :
http://www.afssa.fr
http://www.invs.sante.fr
http://www.pasteur.fr/externe
http://www.cirad.fr/fr/presse/
French veterinary school sites :
http://www.vet-lyon.fr/webex/ga/
http://www.vet-nantes.fr
http://www.envt.fr
http://www.vet-alfort.fr
Official French sites :
http://www.grippeaviaire.gouv.fr
http://www.sante.gouv.fr
http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/thematique/agriculture_m66/
http://www.agriculture.gouv.fr/spip/
http://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/sommaire.php3
http://www.cfes.sante.fr
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/index_en.htm
Scientific information sites :
http://www.cite-sciences.fr/english/indexFLASH.htm
http://www.oncfs.gouv.fr
http://www.futura-sciences.com/sinformer/o/grippe_aviaire.php/
http://www.rfi.fr/langues/statiques/rfi_anglais.asp
http://www.itavi.asso.fr
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International resource center sites :
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/index.html
http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-
cards/special_avian.html
http://www.wetlands.org
http://www.ecdc.eu.int
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/promed/
http://www.inspq.qc.ca/english/
http://www.oie.int/eng/OIE/organisation/en_OFFLU.htm
http://www.livestockworkinggroup.org/
http://www.info.gov.hk/info/flu/eng/index.htm
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/asia.htm
Flock of village ducks in Niger, 2006 - Alexandre Caron, © Cirad
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